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The	   metaphor	   of	   the	   balance	   has	   long	   dominated	   national	   security	   law	   and	   policy.	   As	  
Richard	  Posner	  has	  explained,	  one	  side	  of	  the	  balance	  “contains	  individual	  rights,	  the	  other	  
community	  safety,	  with	  the	  balance	  needing	  and	  receiving	  readjustment	  from	  time	  to	  time	  
as	  the	  weights	  of	  the	  respective	  interests	  change.	  The	  safer	  we	  feel,	  the	  more	  weight	  we	  
place	  on	  the	   interest	   in	  personal	   liberty;	   the	  more	  endangered	  we	  feel,	   the	  more	  weight	  
we	   place	   on	   the	   interest	   in	   safety,	   while	   recognizing	   the	   interdependence	   of	   the	   two	  
interests.”1	  While	  policymakers	  have	  debated	  the	  relative	  weight	  states	  should	  give	  to	  civil	  
liberty	  concerns	  and	  public	  security	  concerns	  in	  various	  contexts,	  few	  question	  the	  general	  
balance	  metaphor	   that	   structures	   these	  debates.2	   By	   all	   accounts,	   interest	   balancing	   has	  
provided	   the	  primary	  model	   for	  making	  national	   security	   law	  and	  policy	  worldwide	  since	  
September	  11,	  2001.	  
	  	  	  	  	  
The	   idea	   that	   states	   must	   balance	   competing	   interests	   when	   responding	   to	   national	  
security	   concerns	   rests	   upon	   two	   implicit	   assumptions:	   (1)	   human	   rights	   are	   interests	  
comparable	   to	   other	   societal	   interests,	   and	   (2)	   a	   state’s	   purpose	   is	   to	   maximize	   social	  
welfare.	   If	   these	   assumptions	   hold,	   the	   state	  may	   reasonably	   sacrifice	   some	   individuals’	  
interests	   to	  avoid	  greater	  harms	   to	  others.	   Judge	  Posner	  and	  others	  have	  employed	   this	  
reasoning	  to	  argue	  that	  practices	  such	  as	  torture,	  discrimination,	  and	  prolonged	  arbitrary	  
detention,	  which	  are	  legally	  prohibited	  and	  morally	  repugnant	  during	  ordinary	  times,	  may	  
be	  acceptable	  during	  emergencies	  where	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  terrorist	  attacks	  that	  would	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imperil	   human	   life.3	   Once	   we	   accept	   the	   assumptions	   upon	   which	   the	   national-­‐security	  
balance	  rests,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  dispute	  the	  conclusion	  that	  all	  human	  rights	  are	  potentially	  
derogable	   during	   emergencies.	   Human	   rights	   become	   vulnerable	   to	   what	   Carl	   Schmitt	  
famously	   described	   as	   the	   “state	   of	   exception”—	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   arising	   from	   the	  
sovereign’s	  prerogative	  to	  suspend	  ordinary	  legal	  norms	  in	  order	  to	  address	  emergencies.4	  	  
	  
This	   brief	   essay	   explores	   an	   alternative,	   deontological	   model	   for	   conceptualizing	   the	  
relationship	   between	   state	   authority	   and	   human	   rights	   during	   national	   emergencies.	   In	  
previous	  writings,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  best	  conceived	  in	  relational	  and	  
legal	   terms	   as	   norms	   arising	   from	   a	   fiduciary	   relationship	   between	   states	   (or	   state-­‐like	  
actors)	  and	  persons	  subject	  to	  their	  power.5	  States	  bear	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  guarantee	  their	  
subjects’	  secure	  and	  equal	  freedom,	  a	  duty	  that	  flows	  from	  their	   institutional	  assumption	  
of	  sovereign	  powers.	  States	  may	  exercise	  sovereign	  powers	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  people,	  but	  
only	  subject	  to	  legal	  limitations	  flowing	  from	  the	  Kantian	  idea	  that	  persons	  subject	  to	  their	  
powers	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  ends	  always	  (the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐instrumentalization)	  and	  the	  
republican	  idea	  that	  persons	  are	  not	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  arbitrary	  power	  (the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐
domination).	   On	   this	   fiduciary	   conception	   of	   authority,	   human	   rights	   represent	   the	  
normative	   consequences	   of	   a	   state’s	   assumption	   of	   sovereign	   powers	   and	   are	   thus	  
constitutive	  of	  sovereignty’s	  normative	  dimension.	  
	  	  	  
The	  fiduciary	  theory	  posits	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  not	  merely	   individual	   interests	  that	  can	  
be	   offset	   by	   other	   societal	   interests.	   Instead,	   human	   rights	   are	   legal	   rights	   that	   protect	  
persons’	   freedom	   and	   dignity	   (not	   interests	   or	  welfare),	   placing	   states	   under	   correlative	  
legal	  obligations	  to	  protect	  those	  rights.6	  To	  satisfy	  their	  fiduciary	  obligations,	  states	  must	  
honor	  the	  equal	  dignity	  of	  all	  persons	  subject	  to	  their	  power;	  they	  may	  not	  instrumentalize	  
or	  dominate	  some	  of	   their	  people	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	  others	   in	   the	   interest	  of	  maximizing	  
social	   welfare.	   States	   may	   never	   derogate	   from	   peremptory	   norms	   such	   as	   the	  
international	   prohibitions	   against	   genocide,	   prolonged	   arbitrary	   detention,	   or	   torture,	  
because	  the	  violation	  of	  these	  norms	  could	  never	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  state’s	  obligation	  
to	   guarantee	   the	   public’s	   secure	   and	   equal	   freedom.7	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   states	   may	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derogate	   from	  non-­‐peremptory	  human	  rights	  such	  as	   freedom	  of	  expression,	   freedom	  of	  
movement,	   and	   peaceable	   assembly—provided	   that	   derogations	   are	   applied	   even-­‐
handedly	  and	  are	  strictly	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	  subjects’	  secure	  and	  equal	  freedom.8	  By	  
emphasizing	  dignity	  rather	  than	  interests,	  and	  secure	  and	  equal	  freedom	  rather	  than	  social	  
welfare,	  the	  fiduciary	  theory	  offers	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  interest-­‐balancing	  metaphor	  that	  
currently	  dominates	  national	  security	  law.	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  fiduciary	  theory	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  has	  broad	  implications	  for	  international	  
human	   rights	   law,	   our	   objectives	   in	   this	   brief	   essay	   are	   modest.	   We	   do	   not	   seek	   to	  
demonstrate	   definitively	   the	   fiduciary	  model’s	   superiority	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	  
model.	   Instead,	   we	   merely	   seek	   to	   show	   that	   recourse	   to	   interest	   balancing	   is	   not	  
inevitable	   in	   national	   security	   decision-­‐making,	   and	   that	   the	   fiduciary	   theory	   of	   human	  
rights	  offers	  a	  plausible	   justification	  for	  departures	  from	  the	   interest-­‐balancing	  approach.	  
We	   begin	   in	   Part	   I	   with	   a	   brief	   introduction	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   interest	   balancing	   in	  
contemporary	  national	  security	  law.	  In	  Parts	  II	  and	  III,	  we	  examine	  two	  cases	  originating	  in	  
Germany,	   which	   each	   defy	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	   model.	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   the	   Federal	  
Constitutional	   Court	   of	   Germany	   declared	   unconstitutional	   legislation	   authorizing	   the	  
military	   to	   intercept	   and	   shoot	   down	   hijacked	   passenger	   planes	   that	   could	   be	   used	   in	   a	  
9/11-­‐style	   attack.9	   In	   the	   second	   case,	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	   (ECHR)	  held	  
that	   German	   law	   enforcement	   authorities	   could	   not	   abrogate	   the	   prohibitions	   against	  
torture	  or	  cruel,	   inhuman,	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  even	  under	  circumstances	  where	  the	  
life	   of	   an	   innocent	   child	   appeared	   to	   be	   at	   stake.10	   Each	   of	   these	   decisions	   emphatically	  
rejects	  the	  interest-­‐balancing	  model	  by	  declaring	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  not	  mere	  interests	  
that	   states	  may	  weigh	  against	  other	   interests	  during	  emergencies.	   In	  Part	   IV,	  we	  defend	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B.	  The	  Logic	  of	  Interest	  Balancing	  
	  
The	   notion	   that	   states	   must	   balance	   individual	   liberty	   interests	   against	   societal	   security	  
interests	   is	   not	   reserved	   for	   emergencies	   alone.	   As	   Jeremy	   Waldron	   has	   observed,	  
proponents	   of	   interest	   balancing	   suggest	   that	   “it	   is	   always	   necessary—even	   in	   normal	  
circumstances—to	   balance	   liberty	   against	   security.”11	   Society	   must	   inevitably	   “strike	   a	  
balance	   between	   the	   individual’s	   liberty	   to	   do	   as	   he	   pleases	   and	   society’s	   need	   for	  
protection	  against	  the	  harm	  that	  may	  accrue	  from	  the	  things	  it	  might	  please	  an	  individual	  
to	   do.”12	   As	   national	   security	   threats	   become	   “graver	   or	   more	   imminent,”	   the	   balance	  
between	   liberty	   and	   security	   “is	   bound	   to	   change	   (and	   it	   is	   appropriate	   that	   it	   should	  
change).”13	   The	   interest-­‐balancing	   model	   thus	   offers	   a	   dynamic	   and	   comprehensive	  
framework	  for	  calibrating	  a	  state’s	  response	  to	  national	  security	  threats.	  	  
	  
Because	   the	   balance	   model	   treats	   both	   liberty	   and	   security	   as	   interests	   subject	   to	  
comparative	  evaluation	  rather	  than	  rights	  that	  may	  operate	  as	  trumps,	  no	  liberty	  interests	  
are	   immune	   from	   derogation,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   abstract.	   The	   classic	   example	   in	   current	  
national	   security	   discourse	   is	   the	   prohibition	   against	   torture.	   International	   law	   classifies	  
the	  prohibition	  as	  a	  peremptory	  norm	  from	  which	  states	  may	  not	  derogate	  (jus	  cogens).14	  
Under	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	   test,	   however,	   an	   individual’s	   human	   right	   to	   be	   free	   from	  
torture	   is	  not	  absolute;	  public	  officials	  must	  weigh	  the	   individual’s	   liberty	   interest	  against	  
the	   state’s	   countervailing	   interest	   in	   obtaining	   information	   that	   would	   promote	   public	  
security.	  Taking	  this	  analysis	   to	   its	   logical	  conclusion,	  Alan	  Dershowitz	  has	  suggested	  that	  
law	  enforcement	  officers	  could	  justifiably	  torture	  terrorist	  conspirators	  in	  order	  to	  avert	  a	  
9/11-­‐style	   attack.15	   Judge	   Posner	   has	   accepted	   torture	   as	   a	   “necessity	   .	   .	   .	   in	   extreme	  
situations”	  and	  has	   intimated	   that	  public	  officers	  may	   justifiably	  employ	   torture	   to	  avert	  
security	  threats	  based	  on	  “a	  moral	  duty	  that	  is	  higher	  than	  their	  legal	  duty.”16	  Even	  critics	  
who	   resist	   the	   legalization	  of	   torture	   tend	   to	  accept	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	  model’s	  basic	  
logic,	   conceding	   that	   torture	   could	   be	  morally	   justifiable	   under	   some	   (exceedingly	   rare)	  
                                            
11	   Jeremy	  Waldron,	  Security	  and	  Liberty:	  The	   Image	  of	  Balance,	  11	   JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICAL	  PHILOSOPHY	   (J.	  POL.	  PHIL.)	  
191,	   192	   (2003).	   	   Waldron	   criticizes	   the	   simple	   formula	   ‘less	   liberty	   equals	   more	   security,’	   claiming	   that	   this	  
abstract	  balancing	  model	  overlooks	  important	  nuances	  that	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  any	  
restriction	   on	   civil	   liberties.	   For	   instance,	   the	   simple	   balancing	   model	   disregards	   the	   fact	   that	   diminutions	   in	  
liberty	  tend	  to	  fall	  disproportionately	  on	  minorities,	  and	  that	  increasing	  state	  power	  also	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  its	  
abuse.;	  see	  also	  Id.	  at	  200-­‐06.	  	  
12	  Id.	  at	  192.	  
13	  Id.	  
14	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  THE	  FOREIGN	  RELATIONS	  OF	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  §	  702,	  comments	  h,	  k	  and	  n.	  
15	  ALAN	  DERSHOWITZ,	  SHOUTING	  FIRE:	  CIVIL	  LIBERTIES	  IN	  A	  TURBULENT	  AGE	  477	  (2002).	  
16	  POSNER,	  supra	  note	  1	  at	  83,	  85.	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circumstances.17	   The	   problem	   with	   torture	   is	   not	   that	   it	   can	   never	   be	   justified	   under	  
cost/benefit	   analysis,	   they	   argue,	   but	   rather	   that	   laws	   legalizing	   torture	   under	   narrow	  
circumstances	  would	  tend	  to	   invite	  broader	  application	  in	  practice,	   leading	  to	  abuse.18	  To	  
resist	   this	   slippery	   slope,	  enthusiasts	  of	   interest	  balancing	  have	   therefore	  set	   their	   sights	  
on	   designing	   a	   robust	   regulatory	   regime	   that	   would	   harness	   the	   societal	   benefits	   of	  
coercive	  interrogation	  techniques,	  while	  minimizing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  abuse.19	  
	  
Once	   we	   accept	   these	   implications	   of	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	   model,	   a	   variety	   of	   other	  
peremptory	  human	  rights	  norms	  become	  vulnerable	  to	  derogation	  based	  on	  social	  welfare	  
considerations.	  For	  example,	  a	   state	  applying	   interest-­‐balancing	  analysis	  might	  choose	   to	  
impose	  prolonged	  arbitrary	  detention	  on	  members	  of	  a	  particular	  religious	  or	  ethnic	  group	  
in	  order	  to	  prevent	  unidentified	  terrorist	  conspirators	  within	  that	  group	  from	  perpetrating	  
mass	   atrocities.	   Interest-­‐balancing	   could	   also	   support	   denying	   terrorism	   suspects	   due	  
process	  rights	  in	  criminal	  trials	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  robust	  procedural	  protections	  could	  lead	  
to	   acquittals	   that	   would	   allow	   terrorists	   to	   go	   free,	   enabling	   future	   attacks	   against	   the	  
public.20	   These	   conflicts	   of	   liberty	   and	   security	   are	   by	   no	  means	   hypothetical,	   of	   course;	  
they	  exemplify	  the	  real-­‐world	  tradeoffs	  that	  states	  around	  the	  world	  have	  made	  in	  crafting	  
laws	   and	   policies	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   threat	   of	   terrorism.	  When	   placed	   in	   the	   balance	   of	  
liberty	   and	   security,	   even	   the	   most	   fundamental	   individual	   liberty	   interests	   may	   be	  
outweighed	  by	  broader	  societal	  interests.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Practitioners	  of	  interest	  balancing	  tend	  to	  view	  this	  model	  as	  the	  only	  plausible	  conceptual	  
framework	   for	   negotiating	   liberty	   and	   security	   concerns	   in	   public	   law.	   For	   example,	   in	  
Terror	   in	   the	  Balance:	   Security,	   Liberty,	  and	   the	  Courts,	   Eric	  Posner	  and	  Adrian	  Vermeule	  
observe	   that	   deontological	   models,	   which	   deploy	   individual	   rights	   as	   trumps	   over	  
considerations	  of	  aggregate	  welfare,	  “risk	  being,	  and	  seeming	  extremist	  and	  impractical.”21	  
The	   problem,	   they	   argue,	   is	   that	   rights-­‐based	   theories	   fail	   “to	   come	   to	   grips	   with	   the	  
inevitability	   of	   tragic	   choices.”22	   In	   matters	   of	   national	   security,	   states	   must	   sometimes	  
                                            
17	  See,	  e.g.,	  Henry	  Shue,	  Torture,	  7	  PHILOSOPHY	  AND	  PUBLIC	  AFFAIRS	  (PHIL.	  &	  PUB.	  AFF.)	  124,	  141	  (1978).	  	  	  
18	   	   Id.	  See	  also	  Judith	  Shklar,	  The	  Liberalism	  of	  Fear,	   in	  LIBERALISM	  AND	  THE	  MORAL	  LIFE	  26-­‐27	  (Nancy	  L.	  Rosenblum,	  
ed.	  1989);	  Waldron,	  supra	  note	  11	  at	  207.	  
19	  To	  this	  end,	  Dershowitz	  has	  proposed	  a	  warrant	  regime	  for	  coercive	   interrogation,	  see	  ALAN	  DERSHOWITZ,	  WHY	  
TERRORISM	  WORKS:	  UNDERSTANDING	   THE	   THREAT,	   RESPONDING	   TO	   THE	   CHALLENGE	   158-­‐59	   (2002),	  while	   Eric	   Posner	   and	  
Adrian	   Vermeule	   have	   advocated	   a	   series	   of	   reforms	   for	   administrative	   oversight	   to	   address	   the	   potential	   for	  
abuse	  in	  coercive	  interrogation;	  see	  POSNER	  &	  VERMEULE,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  209-­‐13.	  	  	  
20	  In	  the	  age	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  Michael	  Dorf	  observes,	  “people	  are	  a	  little	  nervous	  about	  applying	  
that	  maxim	  [that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  let	  10	  guilty	  men	  go	  free	  than	  to	  send	  one	  innocent	  man	  to	  jail]	  where	  the	  10	  guilty	  
men	  who	  are	  going	  to	  go	  free	  could	  have	  biological	  weapons.”	  Waldron,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  204	  (quoting	  Michael	  
Dorf	  in	  Pam	  Belluck,	  Hue	  and	  Murmur	  over	  Curbed	  Rights,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Nov.	  17,	  2001,	  at	  B8).	  
21	  POSNER	  &	  VERMEULE,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  38.	  	  	  
22	  Id.	  at	  187.	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inflict	  a	  “necessary	  evil”	  on	  a	  few	  in	  order	  “to	  prevent	  serious	  harm	  to	  others.”23	  By	  way	  of	  
example,	   Posner	   and	   Vermeule	   dismiss	   as	   “fanatical”	   the	   notion	   that	   a	   state	   may	   not	  
subject	   individuals	   to	   torture	   or	   cruel,	   inhuman,	   and	   degrading	   treatment	   in	   order	   to	  
obtain	  information	  that	  would	  prevent	  a	  grave	  terrorist	  attack.24	   In	  the	  heat	  of	  a	  national	  
security	   crisis,	   reasonable	   decision-­‐makers	   will	   employ	   interest	   balancing	   rather	   than	  
human	  rights	  as	  trumps,	  they	  suggest.	  
	  	  	  	  	  
Although	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  interest	  balancing	  has	  become	  the	  dominant	  model	  in	  
national	  security	  law,	  consequentialists	  such	  as	  Posner	  and	  Vermeule	  have	  been	  too	  quick	  
to	   dismiss	   rights-­‐based	   approaches	   as	   pie-­‐in-­‐the-­‐sky	   fanaticism.	   In	   the	   discussion	   that	  
follows,	  we	  review	  two	  post-­‐9/11	  cases	  in	  which	  courts	  have	  emphatically	  rejected	  interest	  
balancing	   in	   contexts	  where	   the	   stakes	   for	  public	   security	   could	   scarcely	  be	  higher.	  Both	  
cases	  endorse	  a	  rights-­‐oriented	  approach	  that	  rejects	  reliance	  on	  social	  welfare	  concerns	  
where	   state	   practices	   would	   violate	   the	   principles	   of	   non-­‐instrumentalization	   or	   non-­‐
domination.	  These	  cases	  repay	  close	  study	  and	  offer	  resources	  for	  constructing	  a	  plausible	  
rights-­‐based	  model	  of	  national	  security	  regulation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
C.	  Renegade	  Aircraft:	  The	  Aviation	  Security	  Act	  Case	  	  
	  
May	  a	  state	  authorize	  its	  military	  to	  shoot	  down	  a	  passenger	  airliner	  hijacked	  for	  use	  in	  a	  
9/11-­‐style	   attack	   on	   civilian	   targets?	   Most	   advocates	   of	   interest-­‐balancing	   would	   likely	  
conclude	  that	  neutralizing	  a	  “renegade	  aircraft”	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  protect	  a	  greater	  
loss	  of	   life.	  Nonetheless,	   in	  2006	   the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  answered	   this	  
question	  in	  the	  negative	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  such	  action	  would	  violate	  human	  dignity.25	  
	  
The	   context	   for	   the	   court’s	   decision	  was	   a	   statute	   enacted	  by	   the	  German	   legislature	   to	  
deal	   with	   renegade	   aircraft:	   the	   Aviation	   Security	   Act	   (Luftsicherheitsgesetz)	   of	   2003.	  
Following	   the	   terrorist	   attacks	   of	   September	   11,	   2001,	   public	   officials	   around	   the	  world	  
labored	   to	   develop	   response	   plans	   for	   future	   renegade	   airplane	   attacks	   against	  
skyscrapers,	   hydroelectric	   dams,	   nuclear	   power	   plants,	   and	   military	   installations.	   In	  
Germany,	   calls	   for	   legislation	   to	   address	   such	   threats	   reached	   a	   crescendo	   after	   a	  
disoriented	  sport	  pilot	  threatened	  to	  crash	  his	  plane	  into	  a	  skyscraper	  in	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  
in	   January	  2003.26	   In	   the	  Aviation	  Security	  Act,	   the	   federal	   legislature	  authorized	  military	  
                                            
23	  Id.	  
24	  Id.	  	  
25	  Aviation	  Security,	  supra	  note	  9.	  
26	   Felix	   Műller	   &	   Tobias	   Richter,	   Report	   on	   the	   Bundesverfassungsgericht’s	   (Federal	   Constitutional	   Court)	  
Jurisprudence	   in	   2005-­‐2006,	   9	   GERM.	   L.J.	   161,	   185	   (2008),	   available	   at:	  
http://www.germanlawjournal.org/pdfs/Vol09No02/PDF_Vol_09_No_02_161-­‐194_Developments_Mueller.pdf	  
(last	  accessed:	  24	  April	  2012).	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forces	   to	   intercept,	   fire	   warning	   shots,	   and	   threaten	   to	   use	   force	   in	   order	   to	   avert	   “an	  
especially	   grave	   incident”	   (besonders	   schwerer	   Unglűcksfall).27	   Should	   these	   measures	  
prove	   inadequate,	   the	   Act	   further	   authorized	   the	   Federal	   Minister	   of	   Defense,	   in	  
consultation	  with	  other	  officials,	  to	  order	  “direct	  use	  of	  force	  of	  arms”—provided	  that	  “the	  
[targeted]	  aircraft	  will	  be	  used	  against	  the	  lives	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  .	  .	  .	  the	  use	  of	  force	  of	  
arms	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  this.”28	  	  
	  
A	  group	  of	  frequent	  flyers	  filed	  suit	  to	  challenge	  the	  Aviation	  Security	  Act	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  
they	  risked	  becoming	  targets	  of	  military	  force	  in	  a	  renegade	  aircraft	  incident.	  They	  argued	  
that	  the	  Act	  violated	  their	  “fundamental	  rights	  to	  human	  dignity	  and	  life”	  –	  constitutionally	  
enshrined	  under	  the	  Basic	  Law	  –	  by	  authorizing	  the	  military	  to	  treat	  them	  instrumentally	  as	  
“mere	   objects	   of	   government	   actions.”29	   In	   developing	   this	   argument,	   the	   complainants	  
expressly	  contested	  the	  Act’s	  implicit	  liberty/security	  tradeoff:	  	  
	  
The	  value	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  their	  lives	  are	  left	  to	  
the	   discretion	   of	   the	   Federal	   Minister	   of	   Defence	  
according	   to	   quantitative	   aspects	   and	   to	   the	   life	   span	  
presumably	   remaining	   to	   them	   “under	   the	  
circumstances.”	   In	   the	  case	  of	  an	  emergency,	   they	  are	  
intended	  to	  be	  sacrificed	  and	  to	  be	  intentionally	  killed	  if	  
the	  Minister	  presumes,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  information	  
available	   to	  him	  or	  her,	   that	   their	   lives	  will	   only	   last	   a	  
short	   time	   and	   that,	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	   losses	  
which	   are	   imminent	   otherwise,	   they	   therefore	   are	   no	  
longer	  of	  any	  value	  at	  all	  or	  are,	  at	  any	  rate,	  of	  reduced	  
value.	  
	  
The	   state	  may	  not	  protect	  a	  majority	  of	   its	   citizens	  by	  
intentionally	   killing	   a	   minority—in	   this	   case,	   the	   crew	  
and	   the	   passengers	   of	   a	   plane.	   A	  weighing	   up	   of	   lives	  
against	   lives	   according	   to	   the	   standard	   of	   how	   many	  
people	  are	  possibly	  affected	  on	   the	  one	   side	  and	  how	  
many	  on	  the	  other	  side	  is	  impermissible.	  The	  state	  may	  
not	  kill	  people	  because	  they	  are	  fewer	  in	  number	  than	  
the	  ones	  whom	  the	  state	  hopes	  to	  save	  by	  their	  being	  
killed.30	  
                                            
27	  Gesetz	  zur	  Neuregelung	  von	  Luftsicherheitsgesetz	  (Aviation	  Security	  Act)	  §	  14(1)	  (BGBI,	  I)	  (Jan.	  11,	  2005).	  	  	  
28	  Id.	  at	  §	  14(3).	  	  	  
29	  Aviation	  Security,	  supra	  note	  9	  at,	  §	  34.	  	  
30	  Id.	  	  at	  §§	  34-­‐35	  (summarizing	  complainants’	  arguments).	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The	   federal	   government	   staunchly	   defended	   the	   Act	   as	   a	   valid	   exercise	   of	   legislative	  
power.	  The	  Act	  did	  not	  violate	   the	  right	   to	   life	  or	  offend	  human	  dignity,	   the	  government	  
argued,	  because	  its	  measures	  were	  necessary	  “in	  order	  to	  prevent	  an	  even	  larger	  wrong.”31	  
The	  government	  added	  that	  when	  “the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  one	  human	  being	  and	  the	  right	  to	  life	  
of	   another	   come	   into	   conflict	   with	   each	   other,	   it	   is	   incumbent	   upon	   the	   legislature	   to	  
determine	   the	   kind	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   life.”32	   The	   respondents	   also	  
defended	   the	  Act	  on	   the	   ground	   that	   it	   authorized	   the	  use	  of	   force	  only	   in	   emergencies	  
where	   the	   hijacker’s	   deadly	   purpose	   was	   clear	   and	   the	   renegade	   aircraft	   posed	   an	  
imminent	  threat	  to	  other	  human	  lives.33	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  sided	  with	  the	  complainants.	  The	  Court	  observed	  that	  the	  
right	  to	  life	  “demands	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  bodies	  to	  shield	  and	  to	  promote	  the	  life	  of	  every	  
individual”34	   rather	   than	   treat	   some	  persons	  as	  “mere	  objects	  of	   its	   rescue	  operation	   for	  
the	  protection	  of	  others.”35	  “What	  is	  thus	  absolutely	  prohibited,”	  the	  Court	  explained,	  “is	  
any	   treatment	   of	   a	   human	   being	   by	   public	   authority	   which	   fundamentally	   calls	   into	  
question	  his	  or	  her	  quality	  of	  a	  subject,	  his	  or	  her	  status	  as	  a	  legal	  entity	  by	  its	  lack	  of	  the	  
respect	  of	  the	  value	  which	  is	  due	  to	  every	  human	  being	  for	  his	  or	  her	  own	  sake,	  by	  virtue	  of	  
his	   or	   her	   being	   a	  person.”36	  Hence,	   the	  military	   could	  not	  use	   force	   against	   a	   renegade	  
aircraft	  when	  this	  would	  mean	  killing	  innocent	  passengers	  and	  crew	  members:	  “[b]y	  their	  
killing	  being	  used	  as	  a	  means	  to	  save	  others,	  they	  are	  treated	  as	  objects	  and	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  deprived	  of	  their	  rights;	  with	  their	  lives	  being	  disposed	  of	  unilaterally	  by	  the	  state,	  the	  
persons	  on	  board	  the	  aircraft,	  who,	  as	  victims,	  are	  themselves	   in	  need	  of	  protection,	  are	  
denied	  the	  value	  which	  is	  due	  to	  a	  human	  being	  for	  his	  or	  her	  own	  sake.”37	   In	  effect,	  the	  
court	  held	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  not	  authorize	  its	  agents	  to	  privilege	  the	  lives	  
of	   innocent	   persons	   on	   the	   ground	   over	   the	   lives	   of	   innocent	   passengers	   and	   crew	  
members	  in	  the	  air.	  Individuals	  in	  each	  group	  had	  the	  same	  “value”	  irrespective	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	  one	  group	  might	  be	  larger	  than	  the	  other	  or	  have	  a	  longer	  collective	  life	  expectancy.	  
The	  assumption	   that	  passengers	   and	   crew	  of	   a	   renegade	  aircraft	   “are	  doomed	  anyway,”	  
the	  court	  reasoned,	  “cannot	  remove	  its	  nature	  of	  an	  infringement	  of	  their	  right	  to	  dignity”	  
because	   “[h]uman	   life	   and	   human	   dignity	   enjoy	   the	   same	   constitutional	   protection	  
                                            
31	  Id.	  at	  §	  47.	  	  
32	  Id.	  at	  §	  51.	  	  
33	  Id.	  at	  §	  121.	  	  	  	  
34	  Id.	  at	  §	  118.	  	  	  
35	  Id.	  at	  §	  122.	  
36	  Id.	  at	  §	  119	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	  	  
37	  Id.	  at	  §	  122.	  The	  court	  held	  that	  the	  military’s	  use	  of	  lethal	  force	  against	  a	  renegade	  aircraft	  would	  not	  violate	  
the	  right	  to	  life,	  if	  the	  plane	  did	  not	  contain	  any	  innocent	  passengers	  or	  crew	  members.	  Id.	  at	  §	  142.	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regardless	  of	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  physical	  existence	  of	  the	  individual	  human	  being.”38	  Thus,	  
the	   Federal	   Constitutional	   Court	   rejected	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	  model’s	   embrace	   of	   the	  
“necessary	   evil,”	   concluding	   that	   the	   state	   could	   not	   invoke	   specific	   and	   urgent	   security	  
concerns	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  granting	  its	  military	  a	  license	  to	  kill	  innocent	  civilians.39	  	  	  
	  
	  
D.	  Torture:	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany	  
	  
Supporters	   of	   the	   interest-­‐balancing	  model	  might	   reply	   to	   the	   renegade	   aircraft	   case,	   in	  
part,	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  was	  decided	  in	  the	  abstract.	  While	  the	  relevant	  legislation	  was	  
passed	   in	  response	  to	  9/11	  and	  the	  sport	  pilot	   incident,	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  decided	  
the	  case	  in	  a	  factual	  vacuum.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  court	  did	  not	  need	  to	  grapple	  with	  an	  actual	  
decision	   to	   shoot	   down	   a	   renegade	   aircraft	   that	   (let	   us	   assume)	   would	   have	   been	  
destroyed	  by	  terrorists	  in	  any	  event	  and	  with	  a	  much	  greater	  loss	  of	  life.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  
an	   actual	   case	   such	   as	   this,	   the	   argument	   might	   go,	   the	   court	   did	   not	   need	   to	   take	  
responsibility	   for	   a	   greater	   loss	   of	   life,	   and	   so	   it	   was	   able	   to	   render	   a	   high-­‐minded	   and	  
rights-­‐based	  decision.	  Furthermore,	  interest-­‐balancers	  might	  say,	  plausibly	  the	  court	  felt	  at	  
liberty	   to	   stand	   fast	   on	   principle	   because	   it	   believed	   that,	   in	   a	   9/11-­‐type	   situation,	   the	  
executive	  would	  order	  a	   renegade	  aircraft	   shot	  down	   in	  any	  event,	  with	  or	  without	   legal	  
authority.	   Two	   weeks	   after	   the	   decision	   was	   handed	   down,	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defense	  
announced	   that	   he	   would	   do	   just	   this.40	   A	   proponent	   of	   balancing	   might	   therefore	  
conclude	   that,	   in	   an	   actual	   emergency,	   Schmittian	   and	   consequentialist	   imperatives	  
invariably	  (and	  appropriately)	  come	  to	  the	  fore,	  thus	  nullifying	  any	  meaningful	  application	  
of	  the	  court’s	  judgment.	  	  
	  
Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany	  pulls	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  The	  case	  involved	  the	  threat	  of	  torture	  
by	   police	   and	   concrete	   facts	   that	   come	   close	   to	   the	   “ticking	   time	   bomb”	   hypotheticals	  
relied	  on	  by	  interest-­‐balancing	  advocates	  such	  as	  Dershowitz.41	  
	  
On	  September	  27,	  2002,	  Gäfgen,	  a	  27	  year-­‐old	  lawyer	  living	  in	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main,	  lured	  an	  
11-­‐year	   old	   child	   into	   his	   home	   and	   killed	   him.	   Shortly	   after	   the	   child’s	   abduction	   and	  
murder,	  Gäfgen	  delivered	  a	  ransom	  note	  for	  a	  million	  euros	  to	  the	  child’s	  wealthy	  parents,	  
                                            
38	  Id.	  at	  §130.	  	  
39	  The	  court	  noted	  secondarily	  that	  even	  under	  a	  consequentialist	  theory	  of	  the	  right	  to	  life,	  it	  was	  questionable	  
whether	   the	  Aviation	  Security	  Act	   could	  survive	  constitutional	   review,	  because	  there	  will	  always	  be	  uncertainty	  
surrounding	  “how	  long	  people	  who	  are	  on	  board	  a	  plane	  which	  has	  been	  converted	  into	  an	  assault	  weapon	  will	  
live	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  still	  a	  chance	  of	  rescuing	  them.”	  Id.	  at	  §	  131.	  	  
40	  Aufruf	  zum	  Verfassungsbruch?	  (Call	  for	  violation	  of	  the	  constitution?),	  FRANKFURTER	  ALLGEMAINE	  (Sept.	  17,	  2007),	  
available	  at:	  http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/kritik-­‐an-­‐jung-­‐und-­‐schaeuble-­‐aufruf-­‐zum-­‐
verfassungsbruch-­‐1463080.html	  (last	  accessed:	  24	  April	  2012).	  	  	  
41	  Gafgen	  v.	  Germany,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  §§	  10-­‐22,	  47,	  94-­‐100.	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stating	  that	   if	   the	  kidnappers	  received	  the	  ransom	  and	  succeeded	   in	   leaving	  the	  country,	  
then	   the	   parents	   would	   see	   their	   child	   again.	   Gäfgen	   in	   fact	   was	   acting	   alone.	   After	  
delivering	  the	  ransom	  note	  he	  drove	  an	  hour’s	  distance	  and	  hid	  the	  child’s	  corpse	  under	  a	  
jetty.	  	  
	  
On	  September	  30,	  2002,	  Gäfgen	  picked	  up	  the	  ransom	  at	  a	  tram	  station,	  and	  from	  then	  on	  
was	  under	  police	  surveillance.	  He	  deposited	  part	  of	  the	  ransom	  into	  his	  bank	  accounts	  and	  
hid	   the	   remainder	   in	   his	   apartment.	   He	   was	   arrested	   at	   the	   Frankfurt	   airport	   that	  
afternoon,	  with	  the	  police	  pinning	  him	  face	  down	  on	  the	  ground.	  
	  
At	   the	   police	   station,	   a	   detective	   informed	  Gäfgen	   that	   he	  was	   suspected	   of	   kidnapping	  
and	  instructed	  him	  of	  his	  right	  to	  remain	  silent	  and	  right	  to	  counsel.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  police	  
found	  half	  the	  ransom	  money	  in	  Gäfgen’s	  apartment	  and	  a	  note	  concerning	  the	  planning	  of	  
the	  crime.	  Gäfgen	  intimated	  that	  another	  kidnapper	  was	  holding	  the	  child.	  After	  consulting	  
a	  lawyer	  for	  30	  minutes,	  he	  claimed	  that	  two	  co-­‐conspirators	  had	  kidnapped	  the	  child	  and	  
were	  holding	  him	  near	  a	  lake.	  
	  
Early	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  October	  1,	  2010,	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  police	  ordered	  
another	  officer	  to	  threaten	  Gäfgen	  with	  considerable	  pain,	  and	  to	  subject	  him	  to	  such	  pain	  
in	   order	   to	   make	   him	   reveal	   the	   child’s	   location.	   Subordinate	   department	   heads	   had	  
previously	   and	   repeatedly	   opposed	   this	   measure,	   proposing	   instead	   further	   questioning	  
and	   confronting	   Gäfgen	   with	   the	   child’s	   family.	   The	   officer	   followed	   the	   Deputy	   Chief’s	  
order,	   however,	   and	   the	   ECHR	   later	   found	   that	   the	   officer	   threatened	   Gäfgen	   “with	  
intolerable	  pain	  if	  he	  refused	  to	  disclose	  [the	  child]'s	  whereabouts.”42	  This	  treatment	  was	  
to	  be	  administered	  by	  a	  person	  “specially	  trained	  for	  such	  purposes,”43	  and	  who	  in	  fact	  was	  
already	  en	  route	  via	  helicopter.	  Within	  10	  minutes	  of	  receiving	  the	  threat,	  and	  fearing	  its	  
execution,	  Gäfgen	   informed	   the	  authorities	  of	   the	  child’s	  whereabouts	  and	   later	   showed	  
them	  where	  he	  had	  hidden	  the	  body.	  
	  
In	  a	  note	  dated	  October	  1,	  2010,	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  stated	  that	  he	  believed	  the	  child’s	   life	  
was	   in	  danger,	  given	   lack	  of	  food	  and	  the	  temperature	  outside.	  The	  ticking	  time-­‐bomb	  in	  
this	  case	  was	  time	   itself.	   It	  appeared	  that	  only	  a	  confession	  from	  Gäfgen	  could	  defuse	   it.	  
So,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  save	  the	  child’s	  life,	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  ordered	  the	  officer	  to	  threaten	  
Gäfgen	  with	   torture.	  He	  confirmed	   in	   the	   same	  note	   that	   the	   threat	  was	   to	  be	  executed	  
under	   medical	   supervision,	   and	   that	   he	   had	   ordered	   another	   officer	   to	   obtain	   a	   “truth	  
serum”	  to	  be	  administered	  to	  Gäfgen.	   	  	  
	  
Gäfgen	  was	  eventually	  sentenced	  to	   life	   imprisonment	  for	  kidnapping	  and	  murder.	  While	  
the	  Regional	  Court	   that	  heard	   the	   case	   ruled	   that	  his	   confession	  under	   threat	  of	   torture	  
                                            
42	  Id.	  at	  §	  94.	  
43	  Id.	  at	  §	  15.	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was	   inadmissible,	   it	   did	   not	   order	   a	   discontinuance	   of	   the	   criminal	   proceedings.	   The	  
Regional	  Court	  also	  allowed	  into	  evidence	  material	  that	  flowed	  from	  the	  confession,	  such	  
as	   the	   child’s	   body.44	   On	   the	   second	   day	   of	   the	   trial,	   in	   his	   statement	   on	   the	   charges,	  
Gäfgen	   admitted	   to	   kidnapping	   and	   killing	   the	   child,	   and	   on	   the	   final	   day	   of	   the	   trial	   he	  
confessed	  that	  this	  had	  been	  his	  intent	  all	  along.	  He	  made	  these	  admissions,	  he	  claimed,	  to	  
apologize	  and	   take	   responsibility	   for	  what	  he	  had	  done.45	   The	  Regional	  Court	  noted	   that	  
the	   findings	   of	   fact	   concerning	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   crime	   were	   based	   exclusively	   on	  
Gäfgen’s	  confession	  at	  trial,	  and	  that	  this	  second	  confession	  also	  underlay	  “the	  essential,	  if	  
not	   the	   only”	   basis	   for	   the	   court’s	   findings	   of	   fact	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   planning	   of	   the	  
offence.46	  
	  
Gäfgen	  appealed	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  lodged	  a	  complaint	  with	  the	  Federal	  
Constitutional	   Court.	   The	   gist	   of	   his	   appeal,	   dismissed	   without	   reasons,	   was	   that	   the	  
Regional	   Court	   had	   erred	   by	   refusing	   to	   discontinue	   the	   proceedings.	   The	   Federal	  
Constitutional	   Court	   held	   that	   his	   complaint	   was	   inadmissible	   because	   he	   had	   failed	   to	  
show	  why	   criminal	   proceedings	   could	   not	   go	   forward	   once	   the	   coerced	   confession	   was	  
excluded.	  And,	  because	  he	  failed	  to	  raise	  the	  “fruit	  of	  the	  poisonous	  tree”	  issue	  before	  the	  
Federal	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   he	  was	   barred	   from	   raising	   it	   before	   the	   Federal	   Constitutional	  
Court.	  
	  
Gäfgen	  sought	  relief	  before	  the	  ECHR	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  his	  rights	  under	  Articles	  3	  and	  6	  
of	   the	   European	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	  
Freedoms	  had	  been	  violated.	  Article	  3	  provides	  that	  “[n]o	  one	  shall	  be	  subject	  to	  torture	  or	  
to	   inhuman	  or	  degrading	   treatment	  or	  punishment,”	  while	  Article	  6	  provides	  a	   right	   to	  a	  
fair	  trial,	  including	  a	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  and	  a	  right	  to	  counsel.47	  
	  
The	  ECHR	  reaffirmed	  its	  jurisprudence	  and	  other	  international	  legal	  sources	  that	  have	  long	  
held	  that	  the	  prohibition	  on	  torture	   is	  absolute	  and	  admits	  of	  no	  exceptions.48	  The	  Court	  
recognized	   the	   “atmosphere	   of	   heightened	   tension	   and	   emotions”	   under	   which	   the	  
interrogation	   of	   Gäfgen	   was	   conducted,	   and	   that	   the	   police	   officers	   had	   “acted	   in	   an	  
attempt	  to	  save	  a	  child’s	  life.”49	  The	  Court	  nevertheless	  held	  that:	  
                                            
44	  In	  Germany	  there	  is	  no	  hard-­‐edged	  doctrine	  analogous	  to	  the	  U.S.	  exclusionary	  rule.	  
45	  Id.	  at	  §	  32.	  
46	  Id.	  at	  §34.	  
47	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms,	   arts.	   3	  &	   4,	   Nov.	   4,	   1950,	   213	  
U.N.T.S.	  221	  [hereinafter	  “Convention”].	  
48	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  §	  87	  (citing,	  inter	  alia,	  Selmouni	  v.	  France	  [GC],	  no.	  25803/94,	  §	  95,	  ECHR	  
1999-­‐V;	   Labita	   v.	   Italy	   ([GC],	   no.	   26772/95,	   §	  119,	   ECHR	  2000-­‐IV;	   Chahal	   v.	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	   15	  November	  
1996,	  §	  79,	  Reports	  of	  Judgments	  and	  Decisions	  1996-­‐V).	  
49	  Id.	  at	  §§	  106-­‐07.	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Torture,	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	   treatment	   cannot	   be	  
inflicted	   even	   in	   circumstances	   where	   the	   life	   of	   an	  
individual	   is	   at	   risk.	   No	   derogation	   is	   allowed	   even	   in	  
the	  event	  of	  a	  public	  emergency	  threatening	  the	  life	  of	  
the	   nation.	   Article	   3,	   which	   has	   been	   framed	   in	  
unambiguous	   terms,	   recognizes	   that	   every	   human	  
being	   has	   an	   absolute,	   inalienable	   right	   not	   to	   be	  
subjected	   to	   torture	   or	   to	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	  
treatment	   under	   any	   circumstances,	   even	   the	   most	  
difficult.	   The	   philosophical	   basis	   underpinning	   the	  
absolute	   nature	   of	   the	   right	   under	   Article	   3	   does	   not	  
allow	   for	   any	   exceptions	   or	   justifying	   factors	   or	  
balancing	   of	   interests,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   conduct	   of	  
the	  person	  concerned	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  offence	  at	  
issue.50	  
	  
Applying	  this	   interpretation	  of	  Article	  3	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  ECHR	  suggested	  that	  
even	  when	  a	   child	   is	   kidnapped	  and	   thereby	   imperiled	  by	  an	   individual	  with	   information	  
that	  can	  save	  the	  child’s	  life,	  authorities	  are	  still	  not	  permitted	  to	  use	  torture,	  inhuman	  or	  
degrading	  treatment	  to	  coerce	  life-­‐saving	  information	  from	  the	  kidnapper.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  
renegade	  aircraft	  case	  the	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  had	  said	  that	  the	  state	  cannot	  take	  
some	   innocent	   lives	   to	   save	   others,	   here	   the	   ECHR	   determined	   that	   the	   state	   cannot	  
coerce	  life-­‐saving	  information	  from	  a	  kidnapper.	  
	  	  	  
In	   fact,	   the	   ECHR’s	   ruling	   is	  more	   dramatic	   still	   because	   it	   held	   that	   the	  mere	   threat	   of	  
torture	  against	  Gäfgen	  was	  enough	  to	  violate	  Article	  3,	  even	  when	  the	  point	  of	  the	  threat	  
was	  to	  save	  a	  child’s	  life.51	  	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  if	  the	  threat	  of	  torture	  was	  “sufficiently	  
real	  and	   immediate,”	  as	   it	  was	   in	  Gäfgen’s	  case,	   then	  the	  threat	  alone	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  
Article	  3.52	  
	  
Before	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  government	  admitted	  that	  Gäfgen’s	  interrogation	  violated	  Article	  3,	  
but	   argued	   that	   Gäfgen	   was	   no	   longer	   a	   “victim”	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   34.53	  
                                            
50	  Id.	  at	  §	  107	  (emphasis	  added).	  
51	  Id.	  at	  §§	  91,	  108.	  
52Id.	   at	   §91.	   Gäfgen	   alleged	   that	   he	   had	   been	   assaulted	   and	   subject	   to	   additional	   threats	   while	   he	   was	  
interrogated.	  The	  government	  denied	  these	  allegations,	  and	  explained	  Gäfgen’s	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  them.	  In	  
light	  of	  these	  explanations	  and	  the	  domestic	  courts’	  failure	  to	  find	  for	  Gäfgen	  on	  these	  issues,	  the	  ECHR	  held	  that	  
Gäfgen	  had	  not	  met	  the	  burden	  of	  showing	  that	  he	  was	  subject	  to	  further	  abuses.	  Id.	  at	  §§	  96-­‐98.	  
53	  Article	  34	  provides	  that	  “The	  Court	  may	  receive	  applications	  from	  any	  person	  ...	  claiming	  to	  be	  the	  victim	  of	  a	  
violation	  by	  one	  of	  the	  High	  Contracting	  Parties	  of	  the	  rights	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  Convention	  or	  the	  Protocols	  thereto.”	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Moreover,	  domestic	  courts	   in	  Germany	  had	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  torture	  was	  
illegal	   under	   domestic	   law	   and	   violated	   Article	   3	   of	   the	   Convention.	   The	   Regional	   Court	  
drew	   this	   conclusion	   in	   Gäfgen’s	   criminal	   case	  when	   it	   excluded	   the	   coerced	   confession	  
from	  evidence.	  
	  
This	  same	  court	  addressed	  the	  matter	  again	  in	  2004	  when	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  and	  the	  officer	  
who	   made	   the	   threats	   were	   prosecuted	   criminally.	   The	   court	   rejected	   the	   defense	   of	  
necessity,	   finding	   that,	   “[t]he	   protection	   of	   human	   dignity	   was	   absolute,	   allowing	   of	   no	  
exceptions	  or	  any	  balancing	  of	   interests.”54	  While	   the	  officers	  were	  convicted,	   they	  were	  
assessed	   only	   light	   suspended	   fines.55	   The	   court	   found	   the	   officers’	   motivation	   and	   the	  
stressful	   circumstances	   to	   be	   significant	   mitigating	   factors,	   and	   that	   the	   conviction	  
established	  that	  the	  use	  of	   force	  to	  obtain	   information	  was	   illegal.	  The	  Deputy	  Chief	  was	  
later	   appointed	   Chief	   of	   the	   Police	   Headquarters	   for	   Technology,	   Logistics	   and	  
Administration.	  
	  	  
The	  ECHR	  condemned	  the	  sentences	  as	  “manifestly	  disproportionate	  to	  a	  breach	  of	  one	  of	  
the	   core	   rights	   of	   the	   Convention,”	   and	   found	   that	   the	   promotion	   of	   the	   Deputy	   Chief	  
raised	   “serious	   doubts	   as	   to	  whether	   the	   authorities’	   reaction	   reflected,	   adequately,	   the	  
seriousness	   involved	   in	   a	   breach	   of	   Article	   3.”56	   In	   short,	   the	   national	   and	   international	  
judicial	   bodies	   agreed	   on	   the	   absolute	   nature	   of	   Article	   3,	   but	   differed	   on	   the	  
consequences	  of	  its	  application.	  
	  
The	  ECHR	  itself	  split	  11-­‐6	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  had	  been	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  
6,	   with	   the	   majority	   finding	   that	   there	   had	   not.	   The	   minority	   found	   that	   Article	   6	   was	  
violated	  when	  the	  Regional	  Court	  admitted	  evidence	  that	  flowed	  from	  the	  breach	  of	  Article	  
3.	   The	   partial	   dissenters	   called	   for	   a	   clear	   affirmation	   of	   the	   exclusionary	   “fruit	   of	   the	  
poisonous	   tree”	   doctrine.57	   Once	   again,	   there	   is	   unanimity	   on	   the	   principle	   that	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  torture	  and	  threats	  of	  torture	  is	  absolute,	  but	  disagreement	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  
the	   legal	   consequences	   that	   flow	   from	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   prohibition.	   The	   domestic	   and	  
international	   unanimity	   on	   the	   absolutist	   principle	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   interest-­‐
balancing	  claim	  that	  the	  principle	  itself	  is	  “fanatical.”	  
	  
A	  Schmittian	  cynic	  might	  think	  that	  the	  domestic	  courts	  let	  the	  defendants	  off	  with	  a	  wink	  
and	   a	   nod,	   and	   that	   the	   ECHR	   majority’s	   unwillingness	   to	   find	   a	   breach	   of	   Article	   6	   is	  
further	   evidence	   that,	   in	   emergencies,	   executive	   agents	   can	   call	   the	   shots	   with	   relative	  
                                            
54	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany,	  supra	  note	  10,	  §§	  47-­‐48	  (the	  ECHR’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  Regional	  Court’s	  holding).	  
55	  	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  §§	  49-­‐50.	  
56	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany,	  supra	  at	  note	  10,	  at	  §§	  124-­‐25.	  
57	   Gäfgen	   v.	   Germany,	   supra	   note	   10,	   at	   §§	   1-­‐13	   (Rozakis,	   Tulkens,	   Jebens,	   Ziemele,	   Bianku,	   and	   Power,	   JJ.,	  
dissenting).	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impunity.	   Yet	   there	   is	   a	   further	   important	   aspect	   of	   this	   case	   that	   resists	   dismissive	  
cynicism:	  the	  Deputy	  Chief’s	  subordinate	  department	  heads	  refused	  his	  repeated	  orders	  to	  
threaten	  and,	   if	   necessary,	   torture	  Gäfgen.	   Instead	  of	   complying	  with	   those	  orders,	   they	  
proposed	   legal	   alternatives.	   Whether	   their	   disobedience	   arose	   from	   a	   purely	   self-­‐
interested	   fear	   of	   punishment	   or	   nobler	  motivations,	   their	   refusal	   to	   obey	   illegal	   orders	  
suggests	   that	  domestic	  and	   international	   law	  can	  guide	  executive	  decision-­‐making	  during	  
even	   the	   most	   pressing	   and	   time-­‐sensitive	   crises.	   While	   one	   can	   only	   speculate	   on	   the	  
reasons	  the	  department	  heads	  may	  have	  given	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  for	  their	  disobedience,	  it	  
would	  be	  surprising	  if	  illegality	  did	  not	  figure	  among	  them.	  
	   	  	  
	  
E.	  The	  Logic	  of	  Fiduciary	  Duty	  
	  
Advocates	   of	   interest	   balancing	   might	   argue	   that,	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   everyday	  
morality,	  the	  cases	  discussed	  above	  adopt	  an	  overzealous	  regard	  for	  human	  rights.	  Other	  
things	  being	  equal,	  national	  security	  decision-­‐makers	  should	  choose	  to	  save	  more	  innocent	  
lives	   rather	   than	   fewer,	   and	   should	   choose	   that	   a	   (culpable)	   person	   suffer	   a	   threat	   of	  
violence	  (or	  worse)	  rather	  than	  allow	  another	  (innocent)	  person	  to	  lose	  her	  life.	  These	  are	  
the	  basic	  consequentialist	  intuitions	  that	  drive	  the	  interest-­‐balancing	  view.	  
	  	  
What	  advocates	  of	  interest	  balancing	  arguably	  fail	  to	  apprehend,	  on	  the	  fiduciary	  theory,	  is	  
that	   other	   things	   are	   not	   equal,	   because	   public	   power	   is	   held	   in	   trust	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	  
everyone	   subject	   to	   it.	  On	  our	   construal	  of	   the	   fiduciary	   theory,	  public	  power	   cannot	  be	  
used	  in	  a	  way	  that	  deliberately	  treats	  individuals	  as	  mere	  means	  to	  others’	  ends,	  as	  would	  
necessarily	   occur	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   torture	   or	   the	   killing	   of	   innocent	   passengers	   to	   save	  
others.	  
	  	  
The	   theory,	   however,	   does	   not	   rest	   on	   a	   deontological	   insistence	   that	   human	   rights	   are	  
natural	   moral	   rights,	   some	   of	   which	   are	   absolute,	   and	   therefore	   that	   the	   state	   (like	  
everyone	   else)	   must	   respect	   them.	   	   It	   rests	   instead	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   human	   rights	   are	  
relational	  norms	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  state’s	  unilateral	  assumption	  and	  exercise	  of	  sovereign	  
powers.	  In	  previous	  writings	  we	  have	  relied	  on	  Kant’s	  account	  of	  parent-­‐child	  relations	  to	  
explain	   how	   fiduciary	   duties	   arise,	   and	  why	   they	   are	   owed	   by	   the	   state.58	  We	   trace	   this	  
argument	   now	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   state	   can	  owe	   its	   subjects	   a	   fiduciary	   duty	   to	   respect	  
peremptory	  norms,	  and	  how	  these	  are	  part	  of	  a	  regime	  of	  secure	  and	  equal	  freedom.	  
	  
In	   the	   parent-­‐child	   case,	   parental	   fiduciary	   duties	   arise	   by	   operation	   of	   the	   fiduciary	  
principle	  to	  set	  legal	  limits	  on	  the	  parents’	  discretionary	  authority	  over	  the	  child.	  Because	  
the	  child	  cannot	  consent	  to	  the	  parent-­‐child	  relationship,	  the	  fiduciary	  principle	  intercedes	  
to	  ensure	  that	  the	  relationship	  is	  mediated	  by	  legality.	  Thus,	  parents	  must	  act	  toward	  their	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child	   in	   what	   they	   reasonably	   perceive	   to	   be	   the	   child’s	   best	   interests.	   With	   fiduciary	  
constraints	  in	  place,	  the	  parent-­‐child	  relationship	  can	  be	  rightful	  because	  it	  is	  governed	  by	  
law,	  rather	  than	  the	  unilateral	  will	  of	  the	  parent.	  
	  
More	   generally,	   fiduciary	   relations	   arise	   from	   circumstances	   in	   which	   one	   party	   (the	  
fiduciary)	  holds	  discretionary	  power	  of	  an	  administrative	  nature	  over	  the	  legal	  or	  practical	  
interests	   of	   another	   party	   (the	   beneficiary),	   and	   the	   beneficiary	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  
fiduciary’s	   power	   in	   that	   he	   is	   unable,	   either	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   fact	   or	   law,	   to	   exercise	   the	  
entrusted	   power.	   Discretionary	   power	   of	   an	   administrative	   nature	   is	   other-­‐regarding,	  
purposive,	  and	  institutional.	   It	   is	  other-­‐regarding	  in	  the	  strictly	  factual	  sense	  that	  another	  
person	  is	  involved.	  The	  fiduciary’s	  power	  is	  purposive	  in	  that	  it	  is	  held	  for	  limited	  purposes,	  
such	   as	   an	   agent’s	   power	   to	   contract	   on	   behalf	   of	   her	   principal.	   Lastly,	   the	   power	   is	  
institutional	  in	  that	  it	  must	  be	  situated	  within	  a	  legally	  permissible	  institution,	  such	  as	  the	  
family	  or	  the	  corporation,	  but	  not,	  for	  example,	  within	  a	  kidnapping	  ring.	  
	  
Bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  constitutive	  features	  of	  fiduciary	  relations,	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
explain	  how	  the	  state	  and	  its	   institutions	  stand	  in	  a	  fiduciary	  relationship	  to	  their	  people.	  
The	  state’s	   legislative,	   judicial,	  and	  executive	  branches	  all	  assume	  discretionary	  power	  of	  
an	   administrative	   nature	   over	   the	   citizens	   and	   noncitizens	   affected	   by	   their	   power.	   The	  
legislative,	   executive,	   and	   judicial	   powers	   entailed	   by	   sovereignty,	   in	   their	   own	   familiar	  
ways,	  are	  institutional,	  purpose-­‐laden,	  and	  other-­‐regarding.	  Furthermore,	  legal	  subjects,	  as	  
private	  parties,	  are	  not	  entitled	   to	  exercise	  public	  powers.	   For	   this	   reason,	   legal	   subjects	  
are	   peculiarly	   vulnerable	   to	   public	   authority,	   notwithstanding	   their	   ability	   within	  
democracies	  to	  participate	  in	  democratic	  processes.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  state’s	  assumption	  
of	   sovereign	   powers—public	   powers	   that	   private	   parties	   are	   not	   entitled	   to	   exercise—
places	  it	  in	  a	  fiduciary	  relationship	  with	  its	  people.	  
	  
The	  state’s	  overarching	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  citizens	  and	  noncitizens	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  regime	  of	  
secure	   and	   equal	   freedom	  under	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	  Human	   rights	   provide	   the	  blueprint	   or	  
structure	  of	  this	  regime.	  They	  supply	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	   individuals	  can	   live	  free	  
from	  both	  public	  and	  private	  forms	  of	  instrumentalization	  and	  domination.	  To	  sum	  up,	  the	  
fiduciary	   principle	   authorizes	   the	   state	   to	   secure	   legal	   order,	   but	   subject	   to	   fiduciary	  
constraints	  that	  include	  human	  rights.	  
	  
Because	  the	  fiduciary	  principle	  authorizes	  state	  power	  on	  behalf	  of	  everyone	  subject	  to	  it,	  
the	   state	   cannot	   use	   its	   coercive	   powers	   in	   a	   way	   that	   victimizes	   some	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  
others.	   Where	   a	   particular	   action	   or	   policy	   would	   necessarily	   do	   so,	   the	   state	   is	  
peremptorily	  barred	  from	  pursuing	  it.	  Such	  actions	  or	  policies	  are	  anathema	  to	  a	  regime	  of	  
secure	  and	  equal	   freedom.	  Torture	  and	   the	  killing	  of	   innocent	   life	   fall	  within	   this	  narrow	  
category.	  Thus,	   the	   state	   is	  peremptorily	  barred	   from	  engaging	   in	   such	  acts.	  Put	  another	  
way,	  the	  state	  owes	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  its	  people	  to	  respect	  absolutely	  their	  human	  rights	  
to	  innocent	  life	  and	  security	  from	  torture.	  It	  cannot	  weigh	  the	  interests	  protected	  by	  these	  
rights	  and	  sacrifice	  them	  during	  a	  time	  of	  crisis.	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As	   noted	   already,	   most	   human	   rights,	   such	   as	   freedom	   of	   expression,	   movement	   and	  
assembly,	  are	  not	  peremptory	  and	  can	  be	  restricted	  in	  limited	  circumstances.	  While	  this	  is	  
not	  the	  place	  to	  set	  out	  fully	  the	  requirements	  that	  must	  be	  met	  under	  the	  fiduciary	  theory	  
for	  rights	  limitations	  to	  be	  justified	  and	  lawful,	  those	  requirements	  differ	  significantly	  from	  
the	  requirements	  of	  interest	  balancing.	  Under	  the	  latter	  view,	  rights	  can	  be	  restricted	  if	  the	  
limitation	  tends	  to	  promote	  overall	  welfare.	  Under	  the	  former,	  rights	  restrictions	  must	  be	  
publicly	   justified,	   they	   must	   satisfy	   a	   context-­‐sensitive	   test	   of	   proportionality,	   and	   they	  
must	  be	  justifiable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  state’s	  overarching	  mission	  to	  provide	  a	  
regime	  of	   secure	   and	   equal	   freedom.	   For	   example,	   a	   state’s	   fiduciary	   duty	   to	   guarantee	  
secure	   and	   equal	   freedom	   arguably	   entitles	   it	   to	   infringe	   the	   freedom	   of	   expression	   of	  
manufacturers	  by	   requiring	   them	  to	  place	  warnings	  on	  products	   that	  notify	   the	  public	  of	  
possible	  health	  risks	  and	  other	  dangers.59	  
	  
More	  generally,	  under	  the	  fiduciary	  theory	  the	  appropriate	  inquiry	  into	  the	  limits	  of	  state	  
power	  in	  a	  given	  case	  is	  not	  an	  abstract	  moral	  inquiry	  into	  which	  policy	  or	  decision	  would	  
best	   advance	   an	   optimal	   balance	   of	   interests.	   Rather,	   the	   inquiry	   is	   fine-­‐grained	   and	  
institutional	   in	   orientation.	   It	   asks:	   “In	   this	   context,	   what	   institutional	   powers	   could	   the	  
state	   hold	   and	   exercise	   that	   are	   consistent	  with	   its	   fiduciary	   duty	   to	   supply	   a	   regime	   of	  
secure	  and	  equal	  freedom?”	  The	  relevant	  framework	  of	  analysis,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  not	  an	  
open-­‐ended	   assessment	   of	   a	   balance	   of	   interests	   where	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	  
institutions	   (in	   principle)	   makes	   no	   difference	   to	   the	   inquiry,	   but	   a	   much	   narrower	  
contextual	   assessment	   of	   the	   legitimate	   powers	   the	   state	   as	   fiduciary	  may	   possess	   and	  
exercise.	  	  
	  	  
Viewed	   in	   this	   light,	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany	   and	   the	   renegade	  airplane	  case	  may	  be	   seen	  as	  
instances	   where	   courts	   have	   recognized	   that	   there	   are	   some	   things	   the	   law	   cannot	  
authorize	   public	   authorities	   to	   do.	   The	   fiduciary	   theory	   explains	   these	   cases	   as	  
straightforward	  examples	  of	  the	  way	  peremptory	  human	  rights	  lend	  hard-­‐edged	  substance	  
to	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  fiduciary	  principle’s	  authorization	  of	  state	  power.	  Advocates	  of	  interest	  
balancing	  can	  respond	  to	  the	  cases	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways.	  First,	  they	  can	  simply	  reject	  them	  
on	   consequentialist	  moral	   grounds.	   But	   then	   their	   argument	   starts	   to	   look	  more	   like	   an	  
abstract	   normative	   argument,	   one	   that	   gives	   up	   completely	   any	   attempt	   to	   take	   the	  
judgments	  seriously	  and	  explain	  their	  basis.	  
	  	  
Second,	  they	  can	  take	  the	  indirect	  route,	  discussed	  already,	   justifying	  our	  case	  studies	  on	  
the	  grounds	  that	  encroachment	  on	  the	  absolute	  prohibitions	  on	  torture	  and	  killing	  of	  the	  
innocent	  would	   be	   a	   slippery	   slope	   to	  wider	   abuses	   that	  would	   outweigh	   the	   benefit	   of	  
relaxing	   the	  prohibitions	   in	  particular	   cases.	   The	  difficulty	  with	   this	   argument	   is	   not	   that	  
the	  slippery	  slope	  may	  never	  materialize.	  The	  difficulty	  is	  that	  this	  is	  an	  unwarranted	  use	  of	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an	  error	  theory.	   In	  effect,	  advocates	  of	   interest	  balancing	  argue	  that	  judicial	  discourse	  on	  
rights	  is	  purely	  rhetorical.	  Judges	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  speaking	  as	  if	  they	  are	  relying	  normatively	  
on	   one	   thing	   –	   absolute	   rights	   based	   on	   inalienable	   equal	   dignity	   –	   but	   they	   are	   in	   fact	  
relying	   on	   something	   else:	   a	   consequentialist	   cost/benefit	   analysis	   that	   justifies	   the	  
enforcement	  of	  absolute	  rights	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  maximize	  welfare	  over	  the	  long-­‐term.	  If	  
it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  slippery-­‐slope	  problem,	  judges	  should,	  on	  this	  theory,	  decide	  every	  case	  
on	   the	  merits	   of	   its	   contribution	   to	   overall	   welfare,	   without	   presuming	   that	   there	   is	   an	  
absolute	  bar	  to	  torture	  and	  the	  killing	  of	  innocent	  life.	  
	  	  
If	  there	  were	  no	  way	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  courts’	  publicly-­‐stated	  commitment	  to	  absolute	  
rights	  in	  these	  narrow	  contexts,	  we	  might	  have	  reason	  to	  adopt	  the	  error	  theory	  implicit	  in	  
the	   indirect	   approach.	   The	   fiduciary	   theory,	   however,	   makes	   sense	   of	   the	   courts’	  
commitment	  by	  explaining	  peremptory	  human	  rights	  as	  correlates	  of	  the	  state’s	  fiduciary	  
duty	  to	  guarantee	  a	  regime	  of	  secure	  and	  equal	  freedom.	  Rather	  than	  dismiss	  the	  relevant	  
legal	   phenomena	   as	   an	   error,	   the	   fiduciary	   theory	   strengthens	   and	   explains	   the	   rights-­‐
based	   grounds	   on	  which	   judges	   actually	   rely.	   The	   fiduciary	   theory	   thus	   takes	   the	   critical	  
judgments	  seriously	  and	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	  For	  this	  reason	  alone,	  it	  merits	  consideration	  





In	  both	  Gäfgen	  v.	  Germany	  and	  the	  renegade	  airplane	  case,	  courts	  expressly	  rejected	  the	  
argument	   that	   states	   must	   always	   seek	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   individual	   liberty	  
interests	  and	  collective	  security	   interests	   in	  national	  security	   law.	  According	  to	  the	  ECHR,	  
“[t]he	  philosophical	  basis	  underpinning	  the	  absolute	  nature	  of	  [certain	  human	  rights]	  does	  
not	  allow	   for	   any	  exceptions	  or	   justifying	   factors	  or	  balancing	  of	   interests.”60	   States	  may	  
not	   violate	  peremptory	  norms	   such	  as	   the	   right	   to	   life	  or	   the	  prohibition	  against	   torture	  
under	  any	  circumstances,	  these	  courts	  held—not	  even	  to	  avoid	  greater	  harm	  to	  the	  public	  
as	   a	   whole.	   Advocates	   of	   interest	   balancing	   will	   no	   doubt	   criticize	   these	   decisions	   for	  
displaying	  an	  impractical	  and	  morally	  troubling	  preoccupation	  with	  individual	  liberty	  to	  the	  
neglect	   of	   reasonable	   collective	   security	   interests.	  What	   is	  missing	   from	  Gäfgen	   and	   the	  
renegade	   airplane	   decisions	   is	   an	   account	   of	   the	   “philosophical	   basis”	   that	  would	   justify	  
the	  courts’	  rejection	  of	  interest	  balancing	  in	  favor	  of	  peremptory	  human	  rights.	  
	  	  
The	  fiduciary	  theory	  of	  human	  rights	  fills	  this	  gap,	  explaining	  why	  states	  may	  not	  sacrifice	  
the	  peremptory	  human	  rights	  of	  some	  of	  its	  people	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  others.	  States	  bear	  a	  
fiduciary	  obligation	  to	  provide	  a	  regime	  of	  secure	  and	  equal	  freedom	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  
for	  their	  people.	  They	  must	  therefore	  treat	  all	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  their	  powers	  as	  persons	  
endowed	  with	  equal	  dignity	  rather	  than	  as	  objects	  that	  they	  may	  abuse	  or	  destroy	  for	  the	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benefit	  of	  others.	  The	  fiduciary	  obligation	  to	  respect	  human	  rights	  arises	  from	  the	  special,	  
institutionally	  grounded	  relationship	  between	  states	   (or	   state-­‐like	  actors)	  and	   the	  people	  
on	  whose	  behalf	  the	  fiduciary	  principle	  authorizes	  them	  to	  exercise	  public	  powers.	  On	  the	  
fiduciary	  theory,	  states	  may	  not	  violate	  peremptory	  human	  rights	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  life	  
and	  the	  prohibition	  against	  torture	  under	  any	  circumstances.	  If	  they	  do,	  they	  subvert	  their	  
own	  authority	  to	  exercise	  public	  powers	  in	  defense	  of	  national	  security.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  
 
